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When performing a voluntary action the agent is ﬁrmly convinced that he has freely decided to perform it. This raises two questions:
“Is this subjective perception of free will (FW) an illusion?” and “Does it serve a useful purpose?”. The answers are tentatively given by
“The “Bignetti Model” (TBM) as follows: (1) The so called “voluntary” action is decided and performed by the agent’s unconscious mind
(UM) by means of probabilistic responses to inner and outer stimuli; (2) After a slight delay, the agent becomes aware of the ongoing
action through feedback signals (somatosensory, etc.) that are conveyed to the brain as a consequence of its performance. Thus, the
agent’s conscious mind (CM) always lags behind unconscious activity; (3) Owing to this delay, the CM cannot know the unconscious
work that preceeds awareness, thus the CM erroneously believes it has freely decided the action. Though objectively false, this belief
is subjectively perceived as true (FW illusion). It is so persistent and deep-rooted in the mind that the CM is unwilling to abandon it;
(4) The FW illusion satisﬁes a psychological need to secure the arousal of the senses of agency (SoA) and of responsibility (SoR) of
the action. Both SoA and SoR inevitably lead the CM to self-attribute reward or blame depending on action performance and outcome;
(5) Both reward and blame are motivational incentives which foster learning and memory in the CM; the updating of knowledge will
provide new information and the skill required for further action (restart from point 1).
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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The American philosopher John Searle believes that
mind and body are not two diﬀerent entities; that con-
sciousness is an emergent property of the brain, and that
consciousness is a series of qualitative states (Searle,
1997). With regard to the old philosophical question of
duality and FW, Searle is astonished that the problem of
duality has not yet been resolved, and thus asks himself
why we ﬁnd the conviction of our own FW so diﬃcult to
abandon. He writes: “The persistence of the traditional freehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2014.04.001
1389-0417/ 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative
⇑ Tel.: +39 0521 032710, mobile: +39 342 8066908.
E-mail addresses: enrico.bignetti@unipr.it, biriko@icloud.com.will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a
scandal”. Nevertheless, many thinkers have studied this
issue and many papers have been written, but it appears
that little progress has been made. He questions: “Is there
some conceptual problem we have simply ignored? Why is
it that we have made so little progress compared with our
philosophical ancestors?” He is not able to provide a philo-
sophical solution to the question, and rather than adding
further proposals, none of which would be convincing, he
bypasses the obstacle by stating that “the philosophical
mind–body problem seems to me not very diﬃcult. How-
ever, the philosophical solution kicks the problem upstairs
to neurobiology, where it leaves us with a very diﬃcult
neurobiological problem. How exactly does the brain docommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
46 E. Bignetti / Cognitive Systems Research 31–32 (2014) 45–60it, and how exactly are conscious states realised in the
brain? What exactly are the neuronal processes that cause
our conscious experience, and how exactly are these con-
scious experiences realised in brain structures?”
We agree with Searle when he claims to be astonished by
this evidence, but we do not agree with him when he sug-
gests that we should “kick the question upstairs to neuro-
biology” as if FW were not an intriguing issue anymore.
This paper will attempt to take a signiﬁcant step forward
on this issue.
Material events can be described by an external observer
as a chain of causes and eﬀects which, in turn, may be causes
for other eﬀects and so on. Conversely, when we voluntarily
cause an event, we do not feel that we are part of a chain;
rather we consider our action to be the result of free will
(FW). Wegner states that scientiﬁc explanations account
for our decisions and the illusion of FW (Wegner, 2002).
There must always be an objective mechanism, i.e., a precise
relationship between causes and eﬀects, underlying a volun-
tary action. We think that we consciously will what we are
doing because we feel “free from causes” and because we
experience this feeling many times a day (Wegner, 2002).
The obvious question is whether this deep-rooted sub-
jective perception of FW is an end in itself or whether it
plays some functional role in the voluntary action. In this
paper, “The Bignetti Model” (TBM) suggests that FW
(even if an illusion) is so deeply rooted in the agent’s mind
that it must be rooted in a real psychological mechanism of
human cognition. The novelty of this model lies in its
attempt to relate the psychological mechanism underlying
subjective belief (illusion) in FW to the psychological moti-
vation behind cognitive processes. The basic hypothesis
behind TBM is that it is the sole idea of having FW that
gives rise to the experiences of agency and responsibility
of action. In turn, these experiences bring the conscious
agent to judge the outcomes of the action and to rate the
skill with which it is performed relative to his or her
expectations.
2. Main actors in TBM
As an aid to the reader, here is a brief introduction to
the main actors and their interrelationship.
2.1. FW and FW illusion
A popular deﬁnition of FW states that it is “an art for a
particular sort of capacity for the rational agent to choose
a course of action from among various alternatives”
(O’Connor, 2013). Generally speaking a deﬁnition is worth
since it is universally shared, i.e. all of us recognise our-
selves in that deﬁnition. We believe that an outer observer
of human behaviour like a machine or an electronic device
could never come up with that deﬁnition since it cannot
understand too many things of human mind, e.g. the mean-
ing of “choice” or ‘alternatives’. Then the deﬁnition could
only be made through direct experience of the agent’scondition, i.e. after choosing and performing an action.
Under the belief of having freely chosen the action among
all possible alternatives, the conscious agent perceives that
FW is at work. Since the agent must be both the chooser
and the witness (of him or herself), we need to clearly deﬁne
the nature, limits, and subjective perceptions of the
“rational” agent we are dealing with. For example, we must
take into account that the idea of possessing FW is ﬁrmly
rooted in the agent’s psyche. Thus, the deﬁnition of the
agent as “rational” seems limited since it necessarily
excludes the agent’s unconscious world.
Another issue arising from the deﬁnition is the sugges-
tion that FW does not exist though we believe we possess
it (FW illusion). We should ask ourselves if our will is
really free since the action decision-making is conditioned
by the prior stimulus and the best expectation of action
outcome depends only on a cause-eﬀect relationship. Being
that our decision is always ‘conditioned’ we must logically
conclude we are never free. Alternatively, there might be
only one possibility to be really free and that is to decide
an action by chance, for instance by throwing dice (eventu-
ality which might be true of an insane mind). The paradox
lies in the fact that a conscious agent believes in FW
because he or she accepts the possibility that there might
be conditioning even though he or she perceives him or her-
self as an agent who is “free from causes”. Philosophy and
psychology cannot mistake conditioning for a form of free-
dom so the question of why FW illusion is perceived by
everybody needs to be resolved. A possible explanation is
that FW illusion might simply serve as conﬁrmation of
one being alive and sane. Another possibility is that the
illusion of FW might exert a functional role in cognitive
processes.
These inferences may lend credibility to the theory put
forward in TBM.
2.2. FW and consciousness
If you looked for a deﬁnition of ‘consciousness’ in a
philosophical dictionary you would soon desist. The diﬃ-
culty of providing a generally accepted deﬁnition is due
to the gap that exists between the neurobiological mecha-
nisms of brain and the apparently non-physicalist nature
of the mind’s activity (which keeps the debate on dualism
going). There is general consensus that FW and conscious-
ness are closely linked. In fact, the “freedom of will” (Van
Gulick, 2011) has been thought to open a realm of possibil-
ities, a sphere of options within which the conscious self
might choose or act freely. At a minimum, consciousness
might seem a necessary precondition for any such freedom
or self-determination. How could one engage in the requi-
site sort of free choice, while remaining solely within the
unconscious domain? How can one determine one’s own
will without being conscious of it and of the options one
has to shape it?”
A brief survey of current thinking on the relationship
between duality and FW is given to show that we do not
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world belief in the existence of soul (immaterial essence
of each individual, other than the body, source of con-
sciousness, an agent having FW, responsible for thoughts
and actions) depends to a large extent on the inﬂuence of
religion and on one’s social and cultural background. If
men believe in God (whoever he may be) mankind’s
position is dominant with respect to the universe, but sub-
ordinate to God. Thus, the psychological weight of a sub-
ordinate position can be alleviated either by an irrational
faith in God or by self-attributing a speciﬁc domain of
responsibility with regard to material things (although this
is still delegated by God). Conversely, if men do not believe
in God, the individual self may be represented in diﬀerent
ways but cannot be identiﬁed with or considered the site
of soul. In this case, duality becomes less relevant or disap-
pears. Advances in neuroscience serve mainly to support
the mind/brain identity hypothesis, showing the extent of
the correlation between mental and physical-brain states.
Thus, there is a wide range of metaphysical positions in
philosophy, as well as various theories of mind. Here is
where we mention some of the more signiﬁcant examples
of contemporary authors who put forward very diﬀerent
theses on mind–body duality. The ﬁrst are two philoso-
phers and religious thinkers: Hans Jonas (1903–1993),
and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995). Jonas proposed
“Gnosticism” which concerns the dualism between two
opposite or hierarchically dependent elements or forces,
as in the case of matter (heavy, harmful and incompatible
with mysticism and far from any spiritual realisation) and
gnosis (elevated noetic or intuitive knowledge, the deep-
rooted attitude of the soul to moral behaviour). Jonas
deﬁned Gnosticism as a “cardinal” dualism that governs
the relationship between God and world, and correspond-
ingly that of man and the world (Jonas, 1958). Levinas puts
forward a philosophical perspective based on “the ethics of
the Other” where FW employed exclusively for individual
purposes would be nonsense. The Other cannot be made
into an object of the self, and thus, cannot be acknowl-
edged as an object. Levinas summed up his stance by say-
ing that “Ethics precedes Ontology” (Ontology as the
classic study of being). According to a famous statement:
“The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in
a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon
of gentleness” (Levinas, 1991). This is the moment in a per-
son’s life which requires self-responsibility towards “the
Other,” which is considered as irreducibly diﬀerent. Levin-
as’s obituary in The New York Times (Steinfels, 1995) read:
“At the same time, the strict emphasis on ethical duty to
‘the Other” as well as his commitment to Judaism, his
resort to religious language and his many commentaries
on passages from the Talmud and from the Bible separate
Dr. Levinas from currents of post-modernism often viewed
as radically skeptical or nihilistic. . .”
On the opposite philosophical front we ﬁnd “Elimina-
tive materialism” also called “Eliminativism”. In this case,
all or almost all classes of mental states (depending on thephilosopher) are to some extent reducible to physical phe-
nomena. Eliminativism relative to a class of entities means
that class does not exist, so any form of materialism is elim-
inativist regarding the soul. Our mind is beset with false rel-
ics of common sense; moreover, any time we use words like
intention, desire, love etc., in an attempt to describe the
cause and the nature of events in our lives we are simply
applying folk psychology. Neurosciences or other exact sci-
ences will demonstrate sooner or later that such words or
presumed states do not refer to anything material although
real.
One of the most representative eliminativists, American
cognitive scientist Daniel C. Dennett, eliminated duality
from his cognitive theory by presenting the analogy of self
as “a centre of narrative gravity”. Thus, the self becomes
not a physical entity but a purely abstract entity, a sort
of folk-physics that is soberly known as phenomenology
(Dennett, 1992a, 1992b). In a symposium held in Milan
(Dennett 2001), Dennett began his talk explaining the
magic of consciousness by stating: “It seems to many
people that consciousness is a mystery, the most wonderful
magic show imaginable, an unending series of special
eﬀects that defy explanation. I think they are mistaken, that
consciousness is a physical, biological phenomenon – like
metabolism or reproduction or self-repair – that is
exquisitely ingenious in its operation, but not miraculous
or even, in the end, mysterious. . .”. This was the prologue
presenting his basic approach (previously introduced in the
famous book, “The mind’s I” (Hofstadter & Dennett,
1981), which is completely unrelated to Cartesian mind–
body dualism. The correct approach to his theory must
be to remove the “subject”. Thus, he states: “a good theory
of consciousness should make a conscious mind look like
an abandoned factory, full of humming machinery and
nobody home to supervise it, or enjoy it, or witness it”.
If Dennett denies the self, then two important questions
need to be asked: (1) do we need a central agent (in charge)
with direct responsibility for decision-making? (2) is the
agent really or only apparently free when performing a
purposeful action? Apparently, a deterministic perspective
on life with a chain of causes which ultimately determine
our actions is incompatible with belief in FW; on the other
hand, indeterminism leaves no way for deciding a coherent
action too. Thus, Dennett claims that the discussion ‘deter-
minism vs. indeterminism’ is a red herring. At this point,
Dennett suggests we reﬂect on the question: “Does neuro-
science show that we don’t have conscious free will?” He
concludes by saying that several experiments have been
conducted, but none are conclusive. On this basis, and tak-
ing into consideration that human frontiers are freely
evolving in a Darwinian way, we will have to make some
signiﬁcant adjustments to our approach to FW and moral
responsibility. So, if we go back into the mind of individu-
als we discover that “yes, we have a soul, but it is made of
lots of tiny robots”. There is no immaterial “soul” but the
complex wiring and the teamwork of these robots that act
as they are trained to; as they are governed, inspired,
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brain. This is a wonderful machine that manipulates
‘memes’ of information in an analogy with genes
(Dennett, 2003). Dennett claims that in folk thinking if
determinism is true then FW does not exist; therefore
responsibility becomes a myth.
This raises the question whether in folk psychology, the
complex system of robots in our brain can be deemed
responsible for its actions in the way that a soul would
be? If the answer is yes, then the robots in our mind could
be held accountable by law. There are some pioneering
experiments in which the participants in a task cheated a
lot if they were previously convinced by reading a passage
in a book that their brains are only a pack of neurons, that
FW is only an illusion and that their choices are predeter-
mined (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). In our opinion, those
experiments seem to indicate that the agent’s behaviour
can be modiﬁed at any time, only if the idea of FW in mem-
ory contents is modiﬁed by external inputs. To this regard,
TBM stands basically on the assumption that the meta-
representation of self in a conscious agent (what we call
self-awareness) stands on memory content, thus a transient
modiﬁcation of memory content may cause a very diﬀerent
representation of the self and of the inherent behaviour. A
further assumption is that the conscious feeling of exercis-
ing FW in voluntary actions is fundamental to the self-
attribution of agency and responsibility. Self-attribution
of agency and responsibility poses Self (at least the meta-
representation of it) at the centre of awareness waiting
for the pronouncement of a blame or a prize, depending
on the action outcome. This transient condition of the Self
is a necessary prerequisite of human cognition.
2.3. FW and intentionality
In order to address the FW issue and its related questions,
TBMmust necessarily concern itself with conscious will and
intentional actions. Intentionality can be deﬁned as: “the
power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for,
things, properties and states of aﬀairs” (Jacob, 2010). There-
fore, we must consider TBM’s agent to be of sound mind
and dealing with reality, although we cannot claim with
any certainty that either the motivations leading to the
action or the critical evaluations of the outcome on the part
of the agent might not cross over into conscious awareness.
We usually consider the purpose of acting as premedi-
tated, i.e. as the mental causes of our actions only if we
over-intellectualise. While we are consciously witnessing
what we are doing, we are pervaded by the sensation of
having wanted and caused it. Among a number of oppor-
tunities, we believe the action has been chosen freely, even
though not always autonomously; this is the common sense
that brings the idea of the existence of a FW. On the basis
of these assumptions, two main models have been pro-
posed in the current literature, a “Hard” and a “Soft”
model, which support with diﬀerent nuances the existence
of FW (Gillett & McMillan, 2001). The former is a modelthat excludes any conditioning from interfering with the
decisional action. From the rational point of view it is
deﬁnitely unlikely: logic indeed asks us to consider the pre-
meditation of a target as the necessary mind “condition-
ing” to formulate a choice. The second model, the “Soft”
one, suggests that decision-making is a way to follow rules.
The “Soft” model foresees a sort of determinism because of
“the necessity of “rule-following”; though, to block the
simplistic causal move required to ground deterministic
thinking, the “intentionality of rule-following” might be
considered as the result of a conscious, consentient and
individual choice. As you can easily imagine, the epistemo-
logical root of this model is ambiguous and develops as a
typical residual complex unsolved by religious faith. It
exists in countless versions and it is in vogue especially
among philosophers and scientists who have to bear a
weighty social and cultural heritage, mostly derived from
occidental monotheistic faiths.
2.4. Conscious mind (CM) and unconscious mind (UM)
The agent’s conscious and unconscious mind (UM and
CM, respectively) will be deﬁned prior to introducing
TBM’s sequential events. The most appropriate deﬁnitions
of UM and CM used in the model were found in the fun-
damentals of psychoanalysis. According to Freud the mind
consists of three diﬀerent levels: (1) the “conscious mind”
(mental processing of everything that we are aware and
we can rationally think of. It partially includes our mem-
ory, at least that part of memory content we can retrieve
into the domain of awareness); (2) the “preconscious mind”
(the ordinary memory, i.e. that part of the mind that can
retrieve information from or pull them into consciousness,
while we are not consciously aware of this activity at any
given time); (3) the “unconscious mind” (a reservoir con-
taining aﬀects, urges, feelings, thoughts etc. which is there-
fore beyond conscious awareness. Our behaviour and
experience are steadily inﬂuenced by the unconscious, even
though we are unaware of these underlying inﬂuences. The
unconscious is dynamic and is sealed oﬀ from the conscious
mind by a force which he referred to as repression).
Therefore, the CM in TBM seems to fulﬁl the criteria of
the Freudian “conscious mind”, while TBM’s UM, which
is not directly involved in the subjective experience of inten-
tional action and conscious will, would seem to match the
characteristics of both the Freudian “preconscious” and
“unconscious mind. However, a clear-cut distinction
between CM and UM is not realistic (for instance FW illu-
sion is not the product of a “rational” mind, rather it seems
a psychological product of an emotional mind). Thus we
cannot exclude a priori some kind of overlap between
CM and UM. As we will see, all three levels could be extre-
mely important in decision-making, action execution and
cognition-raising.
In TBM the term ‘conscious mind’ could be sometimes
replaced by Freudian “ego” to indicate “that portion of
the human personality which is experienced as the ‘self’
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ception” (Encyclopedia Britannica). However, we generally
prefer to refer to Freud’s earlier theory of the mind, the
topographycal theory concerning with the unconscious,
preconscious and conscious mind. Thus we prefer the term
CM to focus the reader’s attention on its distinct role
though complementary with the UM in cognitive pro-
cesses; moreover, although CM resides in the ego, not all
the operations of the ego are conscious.
As a ﬁnal comment we should underline the analogy
between the roles of CM and UM in TBM and the roles
of “explicit” and “implicit” minds, respectively, in the ﬂow
of the individual experience according to Dietrich’s review
(Dietrich, 2004). The mechanism by which knowledge
shifts from an unconscious state to a conscious state is
one of the most fundamental questions of cognitive science
and lies at the heart of consciousness research. In brief the
intriguing results here are that explicit mind (i.e. higher
cognitive functions mainly supported by frontal and
medio-temporal lobes) and implicit mind (i.e. skill-based
knowledge mainly supported by basal ganglia) are two
functionally distinct though interacting domains of mind.
Thus, several steps occur before knowledge is fully accessi-
ble to consciousness.
Moreover, self-consciousness is a transitory meta-repre-
sentation of the highest order of mind. In fact the frontal
activity intervenes during executive attention, which is nec-
essary to amplify the task at hand until it becomes the
exclusive content of the working memory buﬀer; then it dis-
appears quickly. The content of the explicit system is rule-
based, verbalizable and tied to conscious awareness. So the
ﬂow is always under a critical analysis of the subject before
being externalised. In contrast, the implicit system is
devoted to experience-based and repetitive skill. The ﬂow
can be more complex though related to behavioural autom-
atisms. Moreover, its content is not verbalizable and can
only be conveyed through task performance and is inacces-
sible to conscious awareness. The main advantage of the
implicit system is its eﬃciency. In contrast to the explicit
mind, the implicit system does not seem to be ‘capacity
limited’.
Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have begun
to identify the brain circuits underlying the explicit system.
Evidence that the working memory buﬀer of the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex holds the current content of
consciousness, coupled with evidence that the executive
attentional network of the region is the mechanism to select
the content, suggests that the explicit system is critically
dependent on prefrontal regions. Further evidence also
suggests that medial temporal lobe structures are involved.
All this leads one to infer that the explicit mind is evolu-
tionarily more recent. This hypothesis is consistent with
the view that information processing is hierarchically struc-
tured in animals with a highly developed prefrontal cortex.
The functional hierarchy is devoted to exhibiting the most
sophisticated knowledge representation and explicit mental
abilities in the highest-order prefrontal cortex (Dietrich,2003). Given that the explicit system is subserved by pre-
frontal regions, it follows that a ﬂow experience must occur
during a state of transient hypofrontality that can bring
about the inhibition of the explicit system.
The neural correlates of the implicit system are not so
clear. The basal ganglia are implicated in procedural mem-
ory (motor and cognitive skills), but contribute also to
priming, conditioning, and habituation. Moreover, further
central evidence is that optimal performance involving a
real-time sensorymotor integration task is associated with
maximal implicit mental ability of the tasks execution.
The neurobiological evidence reported in Dietrich’s
extensive review based on electrophysiological data seems
to corroborate a reductionist view of CM and UM in TBM.
2.5. FW and the “Error Theory”
According to Wegner’s point of view FW illusion is a
subjective feeling that arises when the agent is convinced
that he is doing an intentional action ‘free from causes’
and this feeling is reinforced many times a day. Thus,
one may objectively argue that FW illusion is a by-product
of the inﬁnite repetition of a paradigm in which the subject
is both the agent and the witness of the action. Conversely,
a conscious agent can think about his FW as a genuine cau-
sal constituent of the action but he is just deceiving himself.
Since the idea of possessing FW is a subjective feeling that
lags behind the action, the deﬁnition of FW given above
cannot hold.
Other situations in human behaviour have also been
attributed to intrinsic, unavoidable psychological errors.
These cases provided the philosophical bases for the for-
mulation of the “error theory”. Historically, this theory
was introduced primarily to discuss the truth or falsity of
moral rules. The principles on which “error theory” can
stand, lead to the inference that knowledge requires truth.
Thus, if there is no moral truth, there can be no moral
knowledge and moral values are purely chimerical
(Landau, 2010). The philosophy of “naturalism” sees
moral judgments as true and obeying the laws of nature
(Kurtz, 2003), while its opponents claim that moral state-
ments are not reducible to natural terms (Landau, 2004).
Answering this question would be beyond the scope of this
paper; nevertheless, the fundamentals of “error theory”
oﬀer an interesting analogy to the debate concerning the
objective-subjective perspective on FW illusion. As argued
above, the conscious agent is unwillingly drugged into
‘believing’ in FW though this belief is objectively false.
The question is whether this apparent contradiction leads
to a deadlock or, rather, is the necessary preamble to some-
thing else. As we’ll see in detail in TBM, FW illusion is per-
ceived not to drive the intentional action, but simply to
make the agent feel responsible for the action and to foster
further cognitive processes. This second hypothesis avoids
the pitfall of the soul-body duality by making subjectivity
of primary importance in cognition; this is a noteworthy
diﬀerence from other cognitive models.
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(SoR)
Our model stems from the hypothesis that it is simply
because a conscious agent without FWwould mean nothing
in its own eyes that the subjective perspective of FW is so
diﬃcult to abandon. The denial of FW would be a sort of
suicide. We must, therefore, consider two diﬀerent points
of view but arrive at a single conclusion. If we embrace a
reductionist approach (the author’s view), brain and mind
are the same thing. Thus the persistence of duality and the
belief in FW both reside in a psychological error: the agent’s
mind identiﬁes the self with a body-independent entity (or
soul) which, however is a product of mind. Thus an endless
circuit of false attributions is activated without the objective
approval of any outside observer. Instead in this dualism
the mind is a “diﬀerent thing” from the brain, living a life
of its own, and need not be vindicated by the brain. Accord-
ing to a dualist tradition, intuition to an attentive mind is so
easy and distinct that there is no doubt about what we com-
prehend and that we should search for truth by the light of
nature. In nature, our ego might not be in the same space–
time dimension as the brain and brain events (Krader,
2010), then self-identiﬁcation of ego with soul can neither
be proved nor disproved by brain activity.
In summary, according to the reductionist view, the con-
scious agent erroneously believes to possess FW; while
according to the dualist perspective the existence of FW
might be true. From whatever point of view we address
the question, we can infer, ﬁrstly, that the persistence of
the idea of a body-independent spiritual entity instantiated
in our mind is imperishable, despite the fact that the body
is physically deteriorating (the inner sensation that accom-
panies the sense of self is “sameness,” an inferential activity
instantiated in the prefrontal cortex (James, 1980; Van Den
Berg, Vogel, Josic, & Ma, 2011); secondly, that this sense of
self brings with it the idea of possessing FW. The ﬁrst-
person perspective on FW existence may be a subjective
experience rooted in fundamental human needs, that’s
why it is a globally shared phenomenon despite its blend
of theism and atheism.
Except for inner or outer constraints, such as moral rules
or physical limitations posed by the environment, respec-
tively, human beings, deep down, perceive the same degree
of autonomy in both decision-making and action execution.
This raises the question of the roles played by the “Sense of
Agency” (SoA) and the “Sense of Ownership” (SoO). The
SoA is commonly considered a constituent of the sense of
self and the conscious agent refers to it as the feeling of
being causally involved in an action (Gallagher, 2000). Rec-
ognising oneself as the cause of an action requires speciﬁc
mechanisms in the brain to link inner intentions for volun-
tary action with a body- or brain-dependent execution.
Both are inner feelings that we consider essential for con-
sciously deciding, executing and controlling our actions.
Neuroimaging studies have previously provided support
for the existence of a discriminating system, which enablesthe subject to attribute to himself or not the responsibility
for an action in the brain (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Mcguire,
Silbersweig, & Frith, 1996; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Spence
et al., 1997). The capacity to discriminate between a ﬁrst-
person or third-person action perspective is ﬁnely modu-
lated by speciﬁc brain areas (Farrer et al., 2003). It has been
demonstrated that a lesion causing spatial neglect interferes
with self-recognition of the body in movement (Daprati,
Sirigu, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 2000).
As a scientist I would like to be more optimistic than
Searle. For this reason we will propose a psychological
model in which, false or not, the identiﬁcation of CM with
a “free-from-causes” entity and the idea of possessing FW
are both conditions suitable to foster cognition (cf.
Bignetti, 1994, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2010). In this paper the
compatibility of the new model with current literature is
then analysed.
3. The Bignetti Model
We usually consider the purpose of an intentional action
as premeditated only if we evaluate it objectively and intel-
lectualize it (third-person perspective) whereas the very
instant we do something we are beset with the sensation
of having “wanted” and caused it. We believe we have freely
“chosen” the ﬁnal action from among various options. This
is the basic premise for the existence of FW (ﬁrst-person
perspective). “The Bignetti Model” describes the sequence
of events of a voluntary action as having 5 stages:
(1) The so called “voluntary” action is decided and
performed by the agent’s unconscious mind (UM)
by means of probabilistic responses to inner and
outer stimuli.
(2) After a slight delay, the agent becomes aware of the
ongoing action through feedback signals (somatosen-
sory, etc.) that are conveyed to the brain as a
consequence of its performance. Thus, the agent’s
conscious mind (CM) always lags behind uncon-
scious activity.
(3) Owing to this delay, the CM cannot know the uncon-
scious work that precedes awareness; thus the CM
erroneously believes it has freely decided the action.
Though objectively false, this belief is subjectively
perceived as true (FW illusion). It is so persistent
and deep-rooted in the mind that the CM is unwilling
to abandon it.
(4) TheFW illusion satisﬁes a psychological need to secure
the arousal of the sense of agency (SoA) and of respon-
sibility (SoR) of the action. Both SoA and SoR inevi-
tably lead the CM to self-attribute reward or blame
depending on action performance and outcome.
(5) Both reward and blame are motivational incentives
that foster learning and memory in the CM; the
updating of knowledge will provide new information
and the skill required for further action (restart from
point 1).
Fig. 1. Consciousness can learn but cannot decide. In this example the agent is sollicited to write down an answer in response to an external stimulus. Thus
a series of actions are ﬁrst performed by the unconscious mind (UM) (sequence at the top). With a tiny delay (times are only presumptive) the conscious
mind (CM) is awakened by the sensory feedback signals. Thus, CM starts to witness each single action and, for each one, is immediately under the illusion
of having freely and consciously caused it and, then by the sense of responsibility (SoR). The CM is then given to evaluate if the results match expectations
and goals and, consequently, to self-attribute reward or blame; this constitutes motivational reinforcement to cognition (middle sequence). Finally, newly-
acquired knowledge will be used by the UM to carry out other identical or similar actions (bottom sequence). An overview suggests that human knowledge
evolves in a circular (or spiral) sequence of interventions from the UM to the CM and back to the UM.
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can be analysed using TBM is reported in Fig. 1. On the
basis of a probabilistic mechanism, the UM carries out
its best actions in response to a stimulus. After a short
delay, the feedback signals from this series of events awa-
ken the CM in order to give it the opportunity to witness
the events. Immediately, the CM is invested with the feeling
of having decided them. Assuming that the performance of
these actions is successful, the CM can verify, learn and
memorise the correct protocol in response to the stimulus.
In summary, our consciousness cannot decide an action
but it can learn from its outcome and can update its mem-
ory store, thus providing the UM with the most accurate
information possible in order to perform identical or simi-
lar actions in the future.
Several noticeable inferences can be drawn. First, TBM
does not invoke the intervention of a soul or a body-indepen-
dent entity to explain the sequence of events in an intentional
action. The model is based on a psychological mechanism
whereby every time it is awoken, the agent’s CMerroneously
feels as if it is a body-independent entity (or soul) and attri-
butes to itself the role of a self-conscious causal agent, who
decides and chooses “free from causes”. TBM also claims
that the idea of being a body-independent entity is instanti-
ated in the agent’s mind as a primary illusion, whereas theidea of possessing FW is only a by-product. Nevertheless,
both illusions turn out to be an inseparable binomial apt
for fostering cognition. The originality of this model lies in
the causal role of FW illusion, not in driving the action but
in fostering cognition. By means of this illusion the agent
attributes to himself not only the role of player but also that
of author and director in the ‘ﬁlm’ of his life. By observing
the overall sequence of events we may objectively propose
in TBM that the subjective perspective of self and the con-
comitant FW illusion are tricks of the mind. As agent at
the right moment he becomes aware of the ongoing action,
he feels intrinsically dual. In conclusion, TBM reconciles
the ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives to give plausible roles
of duality and FW in human cognition (Bignetti, 2013).
Unlike Searle we propose a self-consistent model in
which we no longer need to kick the question of FW persis-
tence ‘upstairs to neurobiology’. The psychological and
philosophical bases that account for the question have been
posed. It is now neurobiology that should take it further.
To this end, in a review dealing with the onset of a volun-
tary movement and the appreciation of whether this is vol-
untary or not, the author argues that FW is not the driving
force behind it but is only the conscious awareness of it
(Hallett, 2007). Since the sense of volition is a corollary
response to motor discharges arising in the parietal lobe
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introspection, subject to manipulation and illusion. The
sense of agency must come from the appropriate match
of volition and movement feedback, which is likely centred
in the parietal area. The evidence presented and the argu-
mentation in Hallett’s work is of interest since it may pos-
sibly provide a neurobiological explanation of the ﬁrst 4
points of TBM. The 5th point of our model, i.e. the pro-
posal of a functional role of FW illusion in human cogni-
tion, should stimulate neurobiological research to further
investigation.
The relative importance given to SoR which depends on
FW illusion is eﬀective in fostering learning and memory.
Whereas the action execution is an obvious extension of
inner intentions in response to speciﬁc stimuli, the “pri-
mum movens” of our knowledge, i.e. the link between
action performance and conscious perception of causal
agency, remains intriguing. From the discussion above,
we may infer that a personal identity is psychologically
installed in the agent’s mind in order to observe autopoie-
sis: achieving the goal of self-organisation. In the overall
picture, “Free Will” does not exist: it is only a belief of
the inner observer. However, provided the inner observer
survives, this illusion is justiﬁed since it is like an energy
gear for such a cognitive system: it makes PI imagination
work harder and better, i.e. it is the basic requirement for
the reward circuitry operating at maximal eﬃciency; other-
wise, according to Maturana and Varela (1980) and Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch (1991) the system would disinte-
grate (Bignetti, 2001, 2003, 2004). Cognitive systems do
not operate by representing world as a sum of independent
components; knowledge is enacted as a series of distinct
elements, inseparable from structures embodied by cogni-
tive systems. On the one hand, the term “enaction” empha-
sises the growing conviction that cognition is not the
representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind
but is rather the enactment of a world on the basis of its
history and the variety of actions that a being in the world
performs; on the other hand, “embodiment” provides a
systemic and dynamic framework for understanding how
a cognitive self (a mind) can arise in an organism in the
midst of its operational cycles of internal regulation and
ongoing sensorimotor coupling. Another paper solely
devoted to discussing the fundamentals of TBM in connec-
tion with the stimulating thought of Varela would be
useful.
4. Point by point analysis of TBM
4.1. Point 1
TBM argues that ‘free’ decisions are determined by early
brain activity. Libet’s pioneering and controversial studies
(Libet, 1983, 2004) on the timing of action decisions taken
in the brain, observed the onset of early electrical activity,
known as the “readiness potential” (RP), prior to the onset
of conscious will. More recently, it has been shown that theoutcome of a decision can be encoded in the brain activity
of the prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s before it
enters our awareness. This delay presumably reﬂects the
operation of a network of higher level control areas that
begin to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters
our awareness (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). This
data is even more striking in the light of other research sug-
gesting that the decision to move, and possibly the ability
to halt that movement at the last second, may be the result
of unconscious processing (Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008). It
is clear that mental processes that end with an intentional
action pertain to a long chain of thought, each one being
both the eﬀect of the preceding event and the cause of
the forthcoming one. Some preliminary studies of neuroim-
aging techniques, demonstrate that mind reading can antic-
ipate an action by objectively interpreting the neuronal
correlates with action intentions.
These studies are pertinent to our theory given that for
information processing to take place both the UM and the
CM share a sort of common neural ‘language’ or ‘code’
which is legible by brain circuits throughout the process
described in TBM. Neuroimaging techniques are evolving
to such an extent that the neural ‘language’ is also inter-
pretable by a mind reader. A generally accepted view is that
brain activity has evolved towards a probabilistic computa-
tion mechanism. Studies have shown (Koch, 1999) that
each single functional component of a neuron, such as a
voltage-gated Na+-channel or an excitatory or inhibitory
synaptic button, behaves in a stochastic way; however, if
thousands of these neuronal components are engaged by
stimuli from outside or from the network, their activity
can be integrated, giving rise to a probabilistic (i.e. a statis-
tically predictable) response. Thus, neuronal activity is pre-
dictable only if properly stimulated by the environment.
From a historical perspective, we have recently seen the
advent of quantum mechanics, of chaotic non-linear sys-
tems, and of a renewed interest in the laws of probability;
it is conceivable, therefore, that a dynamic model of brain
function based on a statistic-probabilistic mechanism, e.g.,
the “integrate and ﬁre”model (Lapique, 1952) may become
the most popular. Brain activity based on a statistically
predictable computation appears to ﬁt natural events better
than a pure stochastic or deterministic approach (Bullock,
1970; Deco, Rolls, & Romo, 2009; Koch, 1999; Lestienne,
2001). A turning point in research into the brain-mind rela-
tionship was the application of non-linear dynamics to neu-
rosciences, which made the way for new brain activity
models and the evolution of a mechanistic brain into a
more dynamic system. To this regard, we will discuss two
examples of probabilistic systems that could explain the
agent’s computational ability in TBM.
It is our view that the brain’s intrinsic propensity for
thought (a sort of compulsive “desire” to think) is a major
dynamic propellant of the mind (Bignetti, 1994). Accord-
ingly, the dynamic interaction of the brain with its sur-
roundings of the “give and take” type was advanced by
the theory of Continuous Reciprocal Causation (CRC)
E. Bignetti / Cognitive Systems Research 31–32 (2014) 45–60 53(Clark, 1998). Years ago, a similar paradigm was deduced
from the experiments of Ruch (1951): if one moves a ﬁnger
forward to touch a small immobile target, the motion is not
linear but involves a slight oscillatory movement towards
the target, which becomes more pronounced in proximity
to the target. This motion is the brain’s spatial reﬁning of
the ﬁnger’s approach to the target by means of trials and
errors. This voluntary motion is also aided by involuntary
brain areas and the feedback of vision and touch. Here,
rather than a “give and take” mechanism, we should con-
sider a “give, take and evaluate the transient outcome from
action feedback” mechanism. The hand’s position is
relayed by feedback signals, step-by-step, so that the brain
can perform a diﬀerential computation between the real
and expected position. This brain activity is reasonably
explained using Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT), which
has been described by several authors (Kording &
Wolpert, 2006; Norris, 2006; von Hofsten, 2004). BDT sug-
gests that the computational brain behaves in a similar way
to a probabilistic machine, in the sense that decisions are
taken on the basis of statistical terms and functions which
may become relevant to the decision; ambiguous decisions
require larger statistical analyses. Subjective experience
that fosters the acquisition of new knowledge may also
be relevant for the ﬁne-tuning of future decisions.
The CRC model appears inadequate in describing
action-making unless we introduce a computational unit
calculating the derivative of the position along the motion.
It may not be necessary to upload or retrieve long or short-
term memories; we know that sensory memory holds sen-
sory information for a few seconds or less after an item is
perceived (Atkinson & Shiﬀrin, 1968). This type of memory
is outside cognitive control, and may last long enough for
the trial-and-error paradigm to calculate and to adjust
motion direction. Sensory feedback signals ﬁrst awaken
and then inform the CM of what UM has done with a
slight delay. It follows that the theory that action encoding
in sensory memories may last long enough to be conveyed
to the CM, is also appealing to explain point 2.
In conclusion, we can say that TBM is compatible with
the post-adaptive learning mechanism proposed by BDT.
Long-term and short-term memories may also intervene
to provide the unconscious and conscious mind respec-
tively with useful information for action decision-making
and the critical evaluation of action outcomes. The model
is not in conﬂict with the computational probabilistic-
deterministic ability of the brain which leads to predictable
responses.
A second example concerns the “intelligent” behaviour
of an oil droplet entering a water maze and ﬁnding the
shortest way to the exit without making a mistake. The
droplet behaves like laboratory mice after a long period
of training (Lagzi, Soh, Wesson, Browne, & Grzybowski,
2010). This phenomenon is due to chemotaxis. The droplet
and the exit of the maze are pre-treated with opposite ions
so that the oil droplet is naturally ‘pulled’ towards the exit
by the gradient. At least two conditions are necessary forthis to happen (even without a brain): (1) a “pre-existing”
knowledge of the goal and a deterministic self-attraction
between opposite charges; (2) the probabilistic motion of
the droplet that will favour it to cross the attraction ﬁeld.
There are many other examples of probabilistic behaviour
in nature (enzymatic activity, microbial ﬂagellar motion,
etc.) and it stands to reason that if the eﬀect exists before
the cause of an action, the action is predictable. Using this
analogy, when the eﬀects achieved through intentional
action are clear and unambiguous, the agent is conse-
quently predisposed to accept and further interpret the
incoming stimulus in a conditioned, non-free state, though
perceiving an inner freedom from the causes.
An analogy may be drawn between these deductions and
the hypothesis of “the brain’s resting state” made by
Northoﬀ (2012). He retrieved Kant’s hypothesis on speciﬁc
intrinsic features of the mind that enabled the correct inter-
pretation of the information delivered by an external stim-
ulus. This ability of the mind may be dependent on the
early onset of an intimate relationship between the mind
and stimulus (readiness which may be described in opera-
tional terms as resting-state activity). Subsequent action
is spontaneous and independent of the stimulus.
4.2. Point 2
The awakening of the agent’s consciousness during
action performance is made possible by at least two diﬀer-
ent mechanisms.
It has been known for more than a century that the
brain generates its own electromagnetic ﬁeld. This phenom-
enon is widely used in EEG, MEG and TMS. This, in
conjunction with the evolution in ﬁeld theories which were
ﬁrst introduced in Gestalt psychology, inspired McFadden
who elaborated the “conscious electromagnetic ﬁeld the-
ory” (CEMI). As reported in several papers (McFadden,
2002a, 2002b; McFadden, 2006), CEMI is based on the
idea that the combined ﬁring of all the neurons in the brain
generates a complex electromagnetic ﬁeld which may
induce a self-regulation of their activity. According to the
theory, consciousness can be understood as an electromag-
netic phenomenon produced by brain activity. The CEMI
theory provides a realistic physical model that accounts
for the subjective diﬀerence between conscious and uncon-
scious mental processing.
McFadden (McFadden, 2006) examines several clues to
nature and argues that the CEMI might provide a solution
to all of them. For instance McFadden claims that we expe-
rience the inﬂuence of the CEMI ﬁeld as FW. That is why
willed actions feel so diﬀerent from automatic actions: they
are the eﬀects of the CEMI ﬁeld functioning as the inner
cause. To this regard he argues that: “ . . .although like
modern cognitive theory the CEMI theory views conscious
will as a deterministic inﬂuence on our actions, unlike most
cognitive theories it does at least provide a physically active
role for will in driving our conscious actions. . .Our
awareness (the global CEMI ﬁeld) plays a causal role in
54 E. Bignetti / Cognitive Systems Research 31–32 (2014) 45–60determining our conscious actions”. By attributing a deter-
ministic role in guiding purposeful actions to will, he claims
the old Cartesian mind–body dualism has been resolved
and a new matter-energy dualism has replaced it.
Though we appreciate McFadden’s basic concepts, we
do not agree with his view of the role of conscious will in
voluntary action. In TBM, the agent has the perception
of having FW but slightly delayed with respect to the true
action (when his CM is awakened). We cannot, therefore,
attribute to FW an eﬀective role in deciding and executing
an action. We can, however, attribute to the conscious
agent a fundamental, psychological role in fostering learn-
ing and memory processes. Yet CEMI is an intriguing the-
ory since learning and memory are cognitive processes that
either require the presence of a conscious agent and occur
only after the outcome of the action. Thus the awakening
of consciousness in point 2 may well be explained by the
reverberating eﬀect of the electromagnetic loop as a conse-
quence of the occurrence of the events in point 1.
The second point concerns the existence of Rizzolatti’s
“Mirror neurons” (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror
neurons could play a fundamental role in enabling the
“self-mirroring” of action performance, allowing the agent
to have direct experience of action outcomes. In Fig. 1, the
self-mirroring eﬀect could constitute the basic mechanism
in facilitating the awakening of an inner witness prior to
FW illusion.
In fact, mirror neurons represent groups of neurons that
ﬁre both when an animal is performing an action and when
an animal observes the same action performed by another
animal. These neurons have been observed in primates and
other species, including birds. In humans, brain activity
consistent with that of mirror neurons has been found in
the premotor cortex, supplementary motor area, primary
somatosensory cortex and inferior parietal cortex. Accord-
ing to Rizzolatti and colleagues, without action interpreta-
tion and imitation, social organisation and survival are
impossible. Thus, we can assume that in humans there is
a faculty that is dependent upon the observation of others’
actions, known as imitation learning. Human cultural
development could be based on this faculty.
The theory that mirror neurons can facilitate imitation
has been emphasised and adopted by other groups. The
neuroscientist Ramachandran demonstrated that mirror
neuron activity was fundamental for a healthy mind, and
believed that human evolution was mainly the result of imi-
tation learning. This evolution was evidently Lamarckian
because it was dependent on a horizontal spread of infor-
mation through populations (Ramachandran, 2010). How-
ever, not all neuroscientists agree with Ramachandran’s
theory. One of the most plausible criticisms is that imita-
tion requires recognition and recognition requires experi-
ence. Some researchers performed an experiment in
which they compared motor acts that were ﬁrst observed
and then executed to motor acts that were ﬁrst executed
and then observed. The signiﬁcant asymmetry observed
between the two processes led these authors to concludethat mirror neurons do not exist in humans (Lingnau,
Gesierich, & Caramazza, 2009). Despite criticism, the dis-
covery of mirror neurons opened new routes in neurosci-
ence that inspired other dynamic perspectives of brain
function. A heuristic model, the “Shared Circuits Model”
was introduced (Hurley, 2008), which suggested the
existence of an intermediate system mediating a cognitive
elaboration between incoming signals and intentional
actions. Mirroring and the simulation of mirroring is one
part of this artefactual dynamic system. Layered between
the outer world and consciousness, this system enables
human cognitive capacities for imitation, deliberation,
mind reading, motor control and other functions via senso-
rimotor feedback.
Typical aspects of mind reading, such as the attribution
of false beliefs to others, were demonstrated with 15-month-
old infants (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). According to
Gallese (Gallese, 2007) these results suggest that social skills
dependent on these brain mechanisms develop very early,
well before the development of language. There is a ‘struc-
turing’ computational circuit within the premotor system
that can operate in two ways. In the ﬁrst, the circuit can
organise action execution and/or action perception and
imagination via neural connections to motor eﬀectors
and/or to other sensory cortical areas. In the second, the
same system applies both to master language organisation
and to yield ‘abstract inferences’. According to this hypoth-
esis the same circuitry that controls how to move our body,
enables the understanding of the action of others and can,
in principle, also structure language and abstract thought.
In this regard, it would be interesting to know if individ-
uals are fully aware when “inner speech” is activated, in
accordance with Baars (1998). This mechanism allows an
individual to communicate and learn in order to adapt his
actions to the environment for a homeostatic purpose
(Maturana & Varela, 1980). On performing an action, we
may not be aware of it but we can subjectively experience
it by interrupting it and by putting ourselves in a meditative
mood (Bignetti, 2004). The same occurs with the “inner
speech” echo that somehow evokes an interior perception
described by others (Edelman & Tononi, 2000), which prob-
ably corresponds to: “being conscious of being conscious”.
4.3. Point 3
As soon as feedback sensory stimuli of the ongoing
action are conveyed to the brain, the action’s course
becomes explicit to CM in a step-by-step manner (see the
section above: “Conscious mind (CM) and unconscious
mind (UM)” and Dietrich, 2003). Lagging behind UM,
CM cannot see earlier UM’s work; thus the agent believes
it has freely decided the action. This illusion triggers a func-
tionally useful sense of responsibility (SoR) in CM which
exerts a positive eﬀect on cognition (points 4 and 5), despite
the fact it is based on an unavoidable psychological error!
Other aspects of human behaviour have also been attrib-
uted to intrinsic and unavoidable psychological errors.
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lation of “error theory”. Historically, this theory was ﬁrst
introduced to discuss the truth or falsity of moral rules.
A forerunner of the theory was Hume. According to
Hume, no moral knowledge stands on pure truth, and thus
it is purely chimerical (Hume, 1739). This issue is still con-
troversial. The philosophy of “naturalism” sees moral
judgments as true and obeying the laws of nature (Kurtz,
2003), while its opponents claim that moral statements
are not reducible to natural terms (Landau, 2004). This
author aﬃrms that ‘good’ can neither be described in terms
of pleasure and pain nor can it be the product of any of the
natural sciences (physics, biology). Moral nihilists consider
morality to be constructed, i.e., it is a complex set of rules
and recommendations that may provide a psychological,
social, or economic advantage for its adherents, but is
otherwise without universal or even relative truth in any
sense (Landau, 2010). Thus, ethical theories resemble
genetic material that can naturally evolve and beneﬁt from
spontaneous mutations (favourable errors), which increase
the organism’s skilfulness in a society.
In this regard, TBM proposes a human cognitive mech-
anistic theory selected on the basis of FW illusion. This
subjective perspective stands on a psychologically unavoid-
able error, but it ultimately leads to cognition. Objectively,
we can consider the individual perspective of CM as an
error, however, what is epistemically objective may not
necessarily be ontologically objective. Searle (1997) argued
that “where consciousness is concerned, the appearance is
the reality”, thus the truth can be discovered and evaluated
by any interested party if we ﬁnd the way to reconcile 1st-
order and 3rd-order perspectives.
4.4. Point 4
Bodovitz thinks that we become aware only when some
of the content of our underlying cognition is changed by
experience (Bodovitz, 2008). Interestingly, he claims that
the cognitive steps are many separate packages of informa-
tion which may fade in time in the absence of strong inter-
relationships; conscious awareness may function as a
strong glue that avoids the disintegration of the process
of cognition into discrete and independent cycles.
In line with this hypothesis, agents must be aware of
what they are doing in order to assign to themselves SoA
or SoO or SoR; otherwise, the link between cognition and
motivational systems could break down. The congruence
between the two sets of signals, i.e., the self-produced inten-
tions of an action (agency) and the sensory signals that arise
from their execution (ownership) is the compulsory way of
building up the content and attributes of the self. Self-recog-
nition appears early in life because the criterion of congru-
ency has been challenged daily since our birth. It is plausible
that this mechanism plays a fundamental role in improving
individual knowledge and skill with age.
A number of experiments have been conducted to
determine the functional anatomy of the SoA and SoO innormal individuals. For instance, the parietal cortex seems
to be the neural region linked to self-perception; while
sense of ownership in action execution may be located
within the inferior parietal lobe and the temporoparietal
junction (Farrer et al., 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001).
According to Jeannerod (2003) SoA and the integrated
SoO implies an active organism, i.e. an agent with plans,
desires, and actions. Particularly intriguing to us is the
self-perception of controlling one’s own volitional actions.
This statement may well be the necessary link in TBM
between the idea of possessing FW and the rise of SoA
and SoO.
Moreover, following intentionally caused actions, the
sense of agency triggers (in the subject) an interesting illu-
sion concerning the timing of events. By means of Libet’s
paradigm (Libet, 1983, 2004), Haggard and others demon-
strated that when an event is causally linked to a subject’s
intentional action, the perception of the time separating the
decisions from the outcomes of an action is reduced
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). This sort of binding
eﬀect between the two events is strongly correlated to the
SoA (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004). Thus,
the feeling of exercising FW is fundamental to the sense of
self. Altered perceptions of this feeling (generated by hyp-
nosis or by some psychopathological conditions, for
instance) may exert an anomalous control of “voluntary”
acts, so that the agent reports a distorted perception of
the binding eﬀect.
4.5. Point 5
Elsewhere (Bignetti, 2001, 2003), the inherent excitabil-
ity and ﬁring potential of each single neuron (Katz, 1966)
is understood as the intrinsic “desire to think,” motivating
the neuron to contribute to the thinking process. The
expression “desire to think” was provocatively coined for
those opposed to the reductionist view of the thinking pro-
cess. The epistemology of Buddhism considers “desire” to
be the insatiable tendency of an individual mind to extin-
guish all painful stimuli of life (RadhaKrishnan, 1991);
again, this can be seen by thermodynamics as any other
physical–chemical system which needs to spontaneously
evolve to dissipate Gibbs’ free energy. However, the
question remains as to how the brain can manage the activ-
ity of so many neurons in order to be able to execute a
goal-directed thought. To identify the mind’s “driver” or
“organiser” we can either go back to the metaphysical idea
of mind–body duality, or try to introduce some type of bio-
physical mechanism by sorting and integrating a bundle of
coherent memories accumulated during the course of a life
which may give rise to a virtual personal identity. Scientif-
ically speaking, we prefer this second hypothesis, but from
the agent’s ﬁrst-person perspective, the question of
self-ontogeny is irrelevant. In a healthy and conscious indi-
vidual, the performance of a voluntary action in response
to outer (environmental) or inner (mental) stimuli is
motivated by the “desire” to reach a ﬁnal goal. It has been
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fed by incentives of various types and values, devised by
means of a motivational system (Dickinson & Balleine,
1985, 2002). Extensive psychophysical instrumental train-
ing experiments, using rats, have been conducted to under-
stand learning processes. It has been demonstrated that
diﬀerent motivational states may be generated depending
on the experimental paradigm applied. In particular, exper-
iments considered both the type of incentive learning, con-
ditioned by aversive and appetitive reinforcement, and the
experience of hedonic reactions elicited by action outcome
(Dickinson & Balleine, 2002).
The ﬁrst obvious conclusion we can extrapolate from
these experiments is that learning improves as training pro-
gresses. Less evident is the mechanism underlying this
improvement. Once again, the chemotactic behaviour of
the oil droplet in a water maze (point 1) can help us to
answer this question (Lagzi et al., 2010). The aim here is
not to refer to the ‘skill’ of the droplet as a paradox, but
rather to arrive at a general statement concerning the deci-
sion-making process. Every decision must involve both the
behaviour of the probabilistic brain and the content of
individual memory. According to the basic principles of
BDT previously described, the ﬁnal choice (i.e., the choice
of the most likely action) greatly depends on the extent of
our knowledge of its eﬀects. The more predictable the eﬀect
of an action, the easier it is to make a correct decision and
to execute a successful action. Thus, the agent will keep
moving passively towards the target, sustained by a driving
force that will trace a path of least resistance. Like the
droplet in a chemotactic maze, the more coherent and con-
gruent that target appears in our mind, the more eﬃcient
our thinking process will be (Bignetti, 2001, 2003). If the
aﬃnity between the agent and target is already known,
then the action will be the most eﬃcient that can be
expected, otherwise, the skill must be acquired by trial
and error.
Long ago in some behavioural studies, Tolman demon-
strated that voluntary action performance is determined by
the incentive value of the outcome of the action itself
(Tolman, 1949a, 1949b). In his theory, he introduced the
concept of “cathexis” which argued that both animals
and humans cannot predict the degree of the success of
their actions unless they have already acquired a “cathexis”
of what could occur in response to their actions; i.e., they
cannot fully predict the intrinsic value of their actions
unless they have already tried them. Unlike Pavlovian
instrumental learning, Tolman’s “cathexis” theory estab-
lishes that an unconditioned stimulus cannot automatically
trigger a successful response. Thus, the representation of a
meaningful incentive value is instantiated in the motiva-
tional system as a post-adaptive mechanism. The publica-
tion of the “cathexis” theory anticipated Dickinson’s
work and oﬀered him an extraordinary tool for the
interpretation of some experiments performed in rats,
where the rats failed to drink sweet drinks when feeling
thirsty for the ﬁrst time due to sudden water deprivation(Dickinson, 1997; Dickinson & Dawson, 1988, 1989). Each
motivational system may be fuelled by speciﬁc incentive
value. An ample variety of behavioural studies have taken
advantage of the appetitive behaviour of animals and
humans. According to Dickinson and Balleine (2002),
behaviour can be learned via two main motivational mech-
anisms: by the successful outcome of a goal-directed instru-
mental action, or by the classic conditioning stimuli of
aversive or appetitive reinforcement according to the com-
position of the food.
Every time we act, we have the opportunity to test the
relative eﬃcacy of our incentives; thus, we may not only
deduce something new about the stimuli, but we may also
evaluate the adequacy of our motivational system. In other
words, the cognitive processes and motivational systems
appear to be linked because depending on the outcome of
an action, we learn how to ﬁnely tune our motivational sys-
tem for the future (Bignetti, 2001). In this regard, it is an
interesting consideration that FW constitutes a real psy-
chological need of the conscious agent, to the extent that
the two things are inextricably linked. The paradoxical ele-
ment of “intentional” action in TBM is that our knowledge
is updated by means of past experience, so we may deduce
that cognition is a post-adaptive mechanism. Along the
coordinates of knowledge improvement, action will favour
cognition and vice versa (see Fig. 1). This is a type of feed-
forward process, which represents one of the most striking
examples of the Darwinian evolution of knowledge
(Bignetti, 2001, 2004). The mechanism by which we select
and accumulate knowledge and skill in our life depends
on the cooperation between the UM and the CM. Deci-
sion-making and action execution are performed by choos-
ing the best response to a stimulus in memory stores on a
statistical basis, but once the action has been performed
the UM is unable to evaluate the extent of its correctness.
Conversely, the CM cannot decide or perform the action,
but it can a posteriori evaluate, select and memorise the
most correct action from its outcome. Thus, on the one
hand, an unconditioned stimulus cannot automatically
trigger a successful response; and on the other hand, indi-
viduals cannot fully predict the degree of success of an
action unless they enact a series of trials and then select
and memorise the best one (see the quotation to Tolman’s
“cathexis” above). In conclusion, the human cognitive the-
ory proposed by TBM is based on a posteriori discrimina-
tion and the selection of action outcomes similar to the
Darwinian evolutionary process that occurs in life sciences,
and is in contrast to the Lamarckian-type of cognition the-
ory based on the mirroring of other’s actions, proposed by
Ramachandran (2010) (see discussion in point 2).
5. General remarks
5.1. TBM and ethics
Performing an action the agent is so focused on his
OWN ﬁrst-person perspective that, in that instant, he is
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the right action. If a bit later he were to be assailed by
doubts about having made the wrong decision, this thought
is already too late, i.e. doubting his own decision is already
another story, thus belonging to another action. At best,
the agent may rebuke himself for having missed an oppor-
tunity. We disagree with Libet (2004) who claims that since
the subject’s decision is taken too early to be a conscious
thought, there is still the opportunity to put a conscious
veto; ﬁrst, because the probabilistic mind promoting the
action is unconscious and cannot disagree with itself unless
we consider the disagreement still part of the same “deci-
sional” process. Second, the veto (actually, a disapproval)
could be conceived as a secondary action only after the
subject has observed and evaluated the ﬁrst action’s
outcome. A good illustration of this is chensorship during
reality TV shows in the US. The increasing demand for live
television posed a problem for TV networks because of the
potential for technical hitches and inappropriate behaviour
and language. The Federal Communications Commission,
an independent agency of the United States government,
introduced censorship by slightly delaying the broadcast
of live programs; this few seconds’ delay is suﬃcient to sup-
press certain words and images, while keeping the broad-
cast as “live” as possible. In other words, we cannot put
a veto in real time.
The question is, if our actions are decided and executed
by the UM who then is legally liable? Let us see, then, how
TBM relates to Neuroethics. Neuroethics is a term which
was coined in 2002 in the era of applied neurosciences; this
discipline combined bioethics and the study of the eﬀect of
neurosciences on ethics (Roskies, 2002). In this context,
Gazzaniga argues that “personal responsibility is real”
(Gazzaniga, 2011) because it is the product of social rules
established by people and “is not to be found in the brain,
any more than traﬃc can be understood by knowing about
everything inside a car.” The accountability of ethical
behaviour stands on binomials, such as cause and eﬀect,
action and consequence, etc., which belong to a universal
architectural principle similar to other information-pro-
cessing systems (for example, the Internet). Moral rules
enable social relationships to be organised on the basis of
stable, predictable behaviour in any context and time.
Accountability of moral rules in social life provides the
automatic brain with a self-protecting servo-mechanism,
which may put a veto on decisions that may otherwise con-
ﬂict with social rules. Although FW is an illusion, we are
still responsible for our actions, and brain determinism
has no relevance to personal responsibility in real life. To
add weight to his arguments, Gazzaniga claims (in a
review) that scientiﬁc advances in the study of brain mech-
anisms do not undermine the foundations of the action
decision mechanism underlying moral responsibility; so it
is time to get over the idea of FW and move on
(Gazzaniga, 2012). From a diﬀerent perspective, Dennet
claims that the conclusion that FW does not exist, might
means “bad news” (Dennett, 2011). The public generallyconsiders philosophy to be fairly ineﬀectual in everyday
life, however, FW issue matters to people, especially if we
consider its role in determining moral behaviour, then phi-
losophers should intervene clearly and unambiguously on
the FW issue. Since people may think that FW is a myth,
the idea that “my mind made do it” could be a convenient
way of passing the buck and escaping blame and penalty.
The law presumes ‘moral competence’ of an individual in
order to judge him, then, the main question is whether a
robotic mind may acquire a sense of agency and responsi-
bility in order to understand and accept reward or blame.
The wiring of our brain circuits provides us with the cogni-
tive ability to bring about the necessary moral competenc-
es. Thus, the moral imperative of scientiﬁc progress is to
discriminate clearly between the circumstances in which
an individual can and cannot be considered properly
responsible for his action.
Today, neuroethical studies tend to disregard the FW
issue, so that whether science demonstrates FW is an illu-
sion or not is irrelevant. This consideration, however,
opens up another aspect of mind/body duality. According
to TBM, the conscious agent thinks he possesses FW, and
thIs belief, though illusionary, is a real and unavoidable
part of the individual, thus, the importance of TBM lies
in the fact that the ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives of
the role of the conscious agent in intentional action have
the same dignity; they serve as tools to understand the
mechanism of human cognition. In this mechanism, we
do not lose sight of the fundamental role of FW illusion.
In this perspective, the fundamental question is: “Is the
CM a sheaf of experiences collected and organised by some
type of automatism in the brain, or is it the manifestation
of a spirit?” If duality does exist it is easier to discuss moral
responsibility; however, there is an inherent contradiction
in the belief in the automaticity of the brain in intentional
actions (FW illusion) and the self-attribution of free
responsibility in ethical decisions. Alternatively, we wonder
if we can trust the intentions that determine personal and
social behaviour if we believe in TBM (see point 3). Con-
scious FW is invoked to attribute to an individual the
responsibility of an intentional action. A man can be liable
by law only if his actions have been performed with con-
scious intentions (mens rea) (Morawetz, 1980). According
to TBM, FW is not real (at least from the third-person per-
spective) and thus, the obvious inference is that without
FW, we would not have a sense of morality. However, as
we perceive SoA and SoR as real, this feeling makes us
responsible for determining our moral rules and our com-
pliance with the law (Kahn, 1992). We know from psychol-
ogy and cognitive neurosciences that moral judgment and
intentional behaviour is the result of emotions, aﬀects
and rational reasoning ability (Greene & Haidt, 2002).
TBM suggests that decision-making and behaviour are
the predictable responses to a stimulus chosen from a col-
lection of individual memories sorted by the unconscious
mind. The model explains how people falsely believe that
they grow up freely and autonomously albeit with cultural
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empathic relationships that develop between them and
their environment. Since FW illusion is a sort of uncon-
scious error, one is unable to enter into a ‘scientiﬁc’ discus-
sion about it. This belief in FW exists prior to other
cognitive process that attempts to disprove it, and thus,
TBM will be unable to change the opinion of any individ-
ual. However, because laws are acceptable only if their
‘meaning’ is understood, we can argue that ‘education
and scholarship’ will remain the root of civilisation.
Analysing our theory, we can see that action outcomes
and incentives, such as blame and reward, are essential
for the conscious mind to learn correct actions. For actions
with ethical implications we may consider the motivational
incentives of guilt. Feeling guilty may or may not deter-
mine an aﬀective state by which one learns how an ethical
action should be performed in the future. Moral rules,
which are essential for our collective survival, are therefore
the product of natural selection. Through socialisation
children learn the rules and standards of behaviour are
impressed on their memory. This collection of memories
could function as a reference library to be utilised by the
individual unconscious mind for future actions (point 1
in TBM). Obsessive–compulsive disorder, perpetuated by
guilt symptoms that are not easily dispelled, was described
by Freud (1929) as the result of a complex struggle of
“Ego” against threats from the external world (nature
and society), the instinctive demands of “Id” and the criti-
cal and moralizing demands of “Super-ego”. A malignant
super-ego might also be the result of too lenient parenting.
Thus, formal education together with familiar and social
environments are essential for the imprinting of these
moral values.
5.2. Models in the West and in the East: a comparison
We introduced this paper with a quote for Wegner’s
model on the arousal of FW illusion and apparent mental
causation of voluntary action (Wegner, 2002). This model
(WWM) originated from an earlier work with Weathley
(Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). The main diﬀerences between
WWM and TBM are in the fundamentals by which a vol-
untary action is described or in the speciﬁc timing of
events. First of all, in the WWM, the sequence of events
leading to a voluntary action is described as two uncon-
scious processes which bring about conscious thought con-
cerning the action (e.g., intention, expectation) and the
voluntary action, respectively. According to the WWM,
action ‘execution’ is delayed with respect to the thoughts
that cause it. Thus, causal thought is a sort of explicit pre-
diction of action, which can be validated after execution
with the perception of the apparent causal path (which
the authors imply most likely gives rise to the experience
of will). In TBM, unconscious and conscious mental pro-
cesses are brain activities with completely diﬀerent aims
that start and intervene at diﬀerent times, in quick succes-
sion. In particular, UM can only elaborate a response to astimulus thus leading to an action, while CM is activated
with the aim of learning and memorising new experiences
oﬀered by the relationship between the responses to stimuli
and the action outcomes. As already said UM and CM are
both brain activity; however CM lags behind UM and has
no traces about the UM’s activity. The agent’s CM errone-
ously feels as if it is a body-independent entity or soul (pri-
mary illusion) who, possessing FW, decides and chooses a
voluntary action “free from causes” (secondary illusion).
Nevertheless, both illusions turn out to be an inseparable
binomial apt for fostering cognition. The originality of this
model lies in the causal role of FW illusion, not in predict-
ing or driving the action but in fostering cognition.
Moreover, WWM claims that unconscious mental pro-
cesses give rise to conscious thought about the action
(e.g., intention, expectation). In our opinion, the psycho-
logical need in WWM for a conscious mind to decide on
the basis of intentions and expectations is a sort of re-emer-
gence of duality, which is often latent in cognitive sciences.
The only way to resolve Searle’s issue (see above) is to attri-
bute both decision- and action-making completely and
exclusively to UM. In TBM, we assume that UM handles
both rational and emotional information by means of the
same probabilistic mechanism which typically characterises
brain activity (Bignetti, 2003, 2010, 2013; Deco et al., 2009;
Koch, 1999). On the other hand, one could ask how CM
can be motivated by reward/blame incentives in our model.
In point 2, we implicitly assume that CM awakening, is
accompanied by the experience of a meta-representation
of ‘ego’, the sense of ‘self’ or ‘I’. We will not enter into a
discussion of the psychology of the ego, Id and super-ego
here, but will assume as true the activation of memory
and aﬀective circuits where the neural correlates of motiva-
tional incentives such as reward or blame can be found.
Finally, the WWM goes no further than an apparent
causal path, which causes the experience of will without
explaining whether belief in FW, which is deeply rooted
in the psyche, could play a role in conscious processes such
as learning and memory. In TBM, FW illusion serves a
functional role in connection with both the attribution of
responsibility and cognition. We suggest that belief in
FW is an unavoidable psychological need to self-attribute
a degree of supremacy over nature and that it simply
occurs in concomitance with intentional action perfor-
mance, i.e. an emotional urge for potency. The feeling
may wane if the individual is no longer pressured by the
urgency of the action and has time to intellectualize it in
a detached mood.
TBM has much in common with the epistemology of
mind acknowledged by most of the darshana of Hindu ori-
gin (Yoga, Advaita Vedanta, Shamkya and early Buddhism),
Chinese Taoism and Japanese Zen. In Shamkya, for exam-
ple, the role of UM is played by ‘Prakriti’ (a sort of natura
naturans) and the role of CM by ‘Purusha’ (a sort of think-
ing self). Purusha awakens and is lured by the action of
Prakriti and falsely believes he has voluntary decided it
(Aurobindo, 2001). As far as Buddhism is concerned, of
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monk of the Mahayana tradition credited with founding
the Madyamaka school (approximately 150–250 AD),
which claims that sentient beings believe their lives are con-
trolled by volitional actions of a body-independent self,
though they are self-less. This is the mistake of the mind
leading human beings to duality tied and condemned to a
chain of causes and eﬀects which determine the never-end-
ing, painful state of rebirth (samsara). Human beings
should meditate on the psychological prison created by
their own mind to interrupt this endless chain of events
and see Atman beyond the individual self.
The fact is that in the West we are still debating the nat-
ure of self: “Is self a sheaf of experiences collected and well
organised by some type of automatism of the brain, or the
manifestation of a spirit?” We believe TBM might provide
a signiﬁcant contribution to this debate. However, the
correctness of the paradigm as shown in Fig. 1 needs to
be investigated further and, to this aim, experiments are
currently in progress.References
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